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very far into it yet, but it’s possible I might try to do something like that at some point. Mostly 
photography satisfies a different need I think. There are some issues of overlap, because I work on 
philosophy of perception quite a lot and sometimes when you’re doing photography it forces you to 
think about how the camera is representing the world. So perhaps it can help a little bit in thinking 
about how the mind is representing the world.
J: One last question. As was asked to Marcus Rossberg in Aporia’s first issue, what is your favourite 
bar in St Andrews.?
S: Favourite bar? There are so many to choose from! (Deliberates for a long time). I suppose it’s 
Drouthy Neebors probably, though I preferred it before they refurbished it, but there are several 
others that I like.
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ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that by adopting modal agnosticism, the constructive empiricist can 
overcome the scientific realist’s main objection. After introducing Bas van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism and showing how he can respond to three traditional objections 
to his view, I consider James Ladyman’s recent critique. Ladyman correctly argues that 
the  constructive  empiricist  needs  to  distinguish  between  the  observable  and 
unobservable in a non-arbitrary manner. To be able to do so, the constructive empiricist 
must recognise objective modality in nature, but doing so would be at odds with the 
position’s  principle  motivation  of  doing  away  with  inflationary  metaphysics  and 
objective  modality.  I  next  explain John Diver’s  modal  agnosticism.  I  argue that  the 
modal agnostic has the resources available for the constructive empiricist to be able to 
make the distinction Ladyman requires.  Since modal  agnosticism does  not  entail  an 
inflationary  metaphysics,  I  argue  that  it  is  compatible  with,  and  can  thus  save, 
constructive empiricism from Ladyman’s challenge.
1. INTRODUCTION
Scientific realists believe that our best, currently accepted scientific theories are approximately true. 
In his seminal work The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen criticises the realist for the ‘inflationary 
metaphysics’ the position entails and offers in its place a constructive empiricist account of science 
which aims to do without the latter. “To be an empiricist” argues van Fraassen, “is to withhold 
belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, observable phenomena, and to recognise no objective 
modality in nature” (1980, 202). 
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As I shall explain in Section 2, van Fraassen is able to respond to most of the traditional problems 
raised against constructive empiricism. In Section 3, I consider James Ladyman’s recent critique 
(2000,  2004).  Ladyman  argues  that  because  constructive  empiricism recommends  belief  in  the 
empirical adequacy of theories rather than in their truth, the constructive empiricist must recognise 
objective modality in nature in order to allow for a non-arbitrary distinction to be drawn between 
the observable and the unobservable. 
Van  Fraassen  responds  by  maintaining  that  the  constructive  empiricist  can circumscribe  the 
observable in a principled manner without appeal to objective modality. Additionally, he argues that 
if constructive empiricism does in fact need objective modality, being a modal realist would not be 
incompatible with constructive empiricism. I argue that Van Fraassen’s first response is insufficient 
to counter Ladyman’s criticism, and that his second is completely at odds with the empiricist’s 
motivation  of  doing  away  with  ‘inflationary  metaphysics’.  Thus,  as  Ladyman  concludes, 
constructive empiricism seems to be an ‘untenable’ position (2000, 855).
The main aim of this  paper is to suggest a way in which the constructive empiricist  can avoid 
Ladyman’s  objection.  After  outlining  the  possible  world  debate  in  Section  4,  I  explain  modal 
agnosticism as developed by John Divers (2004) in Section 5.  The modal  agnostic,  who holds 
herself as having no warrant for believing in the existence of any possible worlds other than the 
actual world,  aims to secure at  least  some of the benefits  associated with David Lewis’ modal 
realism while avoiding the costly ontology. The modal agnostic does however retain the ability to 
express, among other things, counterfactual claims.
In  Section  6  I  argue  that  by  retaining  licence  to  assert  counterfactual  conditionals,  the  modal 
agnostic  is  able  to  objectively  evaluate  observability  counterfactuals.  This  is  exactly  what  the 
constructive  empiricist  must  be  able  do  in  order  to  draw a  principled  distinction  between  the 
observable and the unobservable. Unlike realism however, modal agnosticism is compatible with 
the empiricist  programme in that  it  does  not  entail  an inflationary possible  world metaphysics. 
Consequently, after examining a couple of possible objections, I conclude by suggesting that if the 
constructive empiricist adopts an agnostic view of modality, she may be able to save herself from 
Ladyman’s criticism. 
1.1 AN IMPORTANT ASSUMPTION
Before proceeding, I need to clarify an assumption I will hold throughout this paper. A commonly 
held belief is that only modal realism can analyse modalities objectively1. My understanding is that 
the constructive empiricist’s  primary motivation is to do ‘without  inflationary metaphysics’ (van 
Fraassen 1980, 73). Since modal realism entails concrete possible worlds, I believe van Fraassen 
considers modal realism to be metaphysically inflationary. I assume that this is why van Fraassen 
consequently makes it part of the empiricist project to ‘recognise no objective modality’. As will 
hopefully become clear, the modal agnostic can analyse many modal notions objectively without 
entailing  an  inflationary  metaphysics.  Consequently,  I  do  not  take  modal  agnosticism  to  be 
incompatible with constructive empiricism on the grounds that it can analyse modalities objectively, 
in spite of what van Fraassen says.
1 See in particular the concluding sections in Ladyman (2000) and (2004), along with Monton and van Fraassen (2003). 
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2. CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM
In  The Scientific Image, van Fraassen criticises scientific realism (SR), which he defines as the 
position holding that:
 (SR) Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world  
is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true.  
(1980, 8, his italics).
In its place, van Fraassen propounds his own antirealist view of the aim of science and of theory 
acceptance which he calls constructive empiricism (CE). Constructive empiricism is that view that:
(CE) Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a  
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. (1980, 12, his italics). 
The key difference between scientific realism and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is the 
difference between literal truth and empirical adequacy. According to van Fraassen’s ‘preliminary 
explication’, a theory is empirically adequate if “what is says about the observable things and events 
in this world is true – exactly if it ‘saves the phenomena’ ” (Ibid, 12). More precisely, the theory is 
empirically adequate if it has at least one model that all the actual phenomena fit inside. Here, ‘all’ 
for van Fraassen is not exhausted by the phenomena already observed, or even those observed at a 
certain time, past, present or future, but by those which are observable. 
2.1 THREE COMMON CRITICISMS OF CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM
Critics of constructive empiricism have concentrated their attacks on three main points. Following 
Ladyman (2000, 840), these can be summarised as follows:
i) Constructive  empiricism grants  ontological  significance  to  an  arbitrary 
distinction because  the  line  demarcating  the  observable  from  the 
unobservable  is  vague,  prone to  change over  time and is  an artefact  of 
accidents of human physiology. 
ii) Constructive empiricism is incoherent because the constructive empiricist 
accepts that  the observable  world is  described using terms that  refer  to 
unobservables and also accepts that all language is theory laden to some 
extent.
iii) The constructive empiricist is an arbitrarily selective sceptic because all 
present data underdetermines which theory is empirically adequate just as 
much as it underdetermines which theory is true. Therefore, constructive 
empiricism is just as vulnerable to scepticism as scientific realism is, and 
the underdetermination of theory by evidence does not entail support for 
constructive empiricism as van Fraassen argues.
Though these arguments initially seem problematic for van Fraassen’s position, the constructive 
empiricist can respond to each.
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2.1.1 OBSERVABLES AND UNOBSERVABLES
The  criticism  that  the  constructive  empiricist  grants  ontological significance  to  the  arbitrary 
distinction between the observable and unobservable ‘misses its mark’ once it is recognised that van 
Fraassen’s claim is an epistemological rather than metaphysical one (Ladyman 2000, 840). Van 
Fraassen  explicitly states  that  “[…] observability has  nothing to  do with existence […] [it]  is, 
indeed, too anthropocentric for that […]” (1980, 19). Constructive empiricism never claims that 
unobservables don’t exist. 
Van  Fraassen  argues  that  it  is  legitimate  to  attribute  an  epistemological significance  to  the 
observable/unobservable distinction. He recognises that the question of where to draw the sharp line 
demarcating observables from unobservables cannot be defined in a non-arbitrary manner. What 
follows from this is that ‘observable’ is a vague predicate. Van Fraassen argues that “[…] predicates 
in natural language are almost all vague, and there is no problem in their use; only in formulating 
the logic that governs them” (1980, 16).
Though meant only as a ‘rough guide’ to avoid fallacies, van Fraassen characterises what counts as 
observable as: “X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present to us 
under those circumstances, then we observe it” (1980:16). What we can or cannot observe is a 
direct consequence of the fact that:
The human  organism is,  from the  point  of  view of  physics,  a  certain  kind  of  measuring 
apparatus. As such it has certain inherent limitations – which will be described in detail in the 
final physics and biology. It is these limitations to which the ‘able’ in ‘observable’ refers – our 
limitations, qua human beings (1980: 17)
For example, the moons of Jupiter which we observe when we look through a telescope are a clear 
case of observation since our best current scientific theories say that  were someone to get close 
enough to them, then they would observe them. On the contrary, our current theories do not tell us 
that we can directly observe particles in cloud chambers. Van Fraassen draws an analogy with a jet’s 
vapour trail (1980, 17). When we observe a vapour trail, we do not observe the jet directly but 
rather detect it. If our current theories are correct in saying that positrons exist for example, then we 
detect them by means of observing their tracks in a cloud chamber. However, since we can never 
directly experience subatomic particles (as we can jets), empirically equivalent but incompatible 
rival theories which deny the existence of positrons are always a possibility. So, concludes van 
Fraassen, it is legitimate to attribute an epistemological significance to the observable/unobservable 
distinction.
2.1.2 THEORETICAL LANGUAGE
The claim that  the constructive empiricist  is  incoherent  because he accepts that  the observable 
world is described using terms that refer to unobservables and that all language is theory laden to 
some  extent,  is  a  criticism  which  van  Fraassen  pre-empts  early  on  in  The  Scientific  Image. 
Accepting a theory, he says, “clearly involves more than belief” in the theory’s empirical adequacy 
(1980, 12). This is so because a scientist is never confronted with a complete theory. Consequently, 
in accepting an incomplete theory the scientist involves himself in a research programme – one that 
could have been very different if he had accepted another empirically adequate, but rival, theory. 
For  non-scientists,  acceptance  still  involves  a  certain  commitment  to  “confront  any  future 
phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of [the] theory”. “Thus”, concludes van Fraassen, 
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“acceptance involves not only belief but a certain commitment” (1980, 12).
Consequently, van Fraassen concedes to the realist that the constructive empiricist often has to use 
the language of science understood literally. In fact, sometimes there is ‘no other way’ to describe 
the world and the objects in it, such as microwave ovens or VHF receivers. But, he says:
From  this  it  does  not  follow  that  I  believe  that  the  concept  of  very  high  frequency 
electromagnetic waves corresponds to an individually identifiable element of reality. Concepts 
involve theories and are inconceivable without them […] [b]ut immersion in the theoretical 
world-picture does not preclude ‘bracketing’ its ontological implications (Ibid, 81).
Immersing oneself in the world described by scientific theories is thus necessary, but, as Ladyman 
notes,  van  Fraassen  maintains  that  this  only  ever  provides  pragmatic support  for  a  theory’s 
theoretical commitments.  While the language of science should be understood literally, “there is no 
need to believe good theories to be true, nor to believe ipso facto that the entities they postulate are 
real” (van Fraassen 1980, 11-2). Using the theoretical language of a theory remains consistent with 
withholding belief in the truth of the theory. Thus, van Fraassen counters criticism (ii). 
2.1.3 UNDERDETERMINATION AND SELECTIVE SCEPTICISM
Ladyman  calls  the  third  criticism of  van  Fraassen’s  scepticism about  unobservables  ‘the  most 
popular realist response’ – it is also the most problematic for the constructive empiricist. Ladyman 
characterises the underdetermination problem as follows (2000, 842):
[…] all the facts about observable states of affairs will underdetermine theory-choice between 
T0,  a  full  realistically construed theory,  and T1,  the claim that  T0 is  empirically adequate. 
However, all the evidence we have available now will underdetermine the choice between T1 
and T2, the claim that T0 is empirically adequate before the year 2001. Furthermore all the 
facts about all actually observed states of affairs at all times will underdetermine the choice 
between T1 and T3, the claim that T0 describes all actually observed events.
Thus,  even  the  judgement  that  T0 is  empirically  adequate  is  underdetermined by the  available 
evidence. The realist at least may argue that inference to the best explanation (IBE) warrants belief 
in T0 and breaks the underdetermination (Op Cit), but van Fraassen cannot since he rejects IBE by 
saying:
[A person] becomes irrational […] if he adopts it as a rule to [use IBE], and even more so if he 
regards us as rationally compelled by it (1989, 142).  
In place of IBE, van Fraassen advocates what he calls ‘voluntarism’ in epistemology, according to 
which ampliative inferences are not irrational so long as constraints of consistency (e.g. such as 
those imposed by probability theory) are not violated (1989). 
The constructive empiricist needs an ampliative principle to support the move from the extreme 
sceptical hypothesis that the world looks as if it exists to the view that the world does exist. Michael 
Devitt  (2005) argues however that  the same principle could be used to accept abduction to the 
existence of unobservables. Since van Fraassen nevertheless refuses to believe in the existence of 
unobservables, his scepticism must be arbitrary and selective concludes the realist (Ladyman 2000, 
845).
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2.2 A POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM
Van Fraassen acknowledges that even in endorsing a simple perceptual judgement, and certainly in 
accepting a theory as empirically adequate, he is “sticking [his] neck out”. But, he argues, “[t]here 
is no argument there for belief in the truth of the accepted theories, since it is not an epistemological 
principle that one might as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb” (1980, 72). That is to say, if belief 
in empirical adequacy is sufficient to account for the aims and practices of science, then, despite the 
fact that the ampliative inference used to move away from extreme scepticism could be used to 
support the realist’s claim as well as the empiricist’s, going further than empirical adequacy would 
amount to taking an unnecessary epistemic risk for no extra empirical gain. 
On the other hand, realists such as Psillos claim that at least realism can offer explanations for the 
observable  phenomena  and  claim  that  science  has  “push[ed]  back  the  frontiers  of  ignorance” 
(Psillos 1996, 42). However, as Ladyman notes, van Fraassen is content to argue that  empiricists 
should be constructive empiricists rather than scientific realists because, from an empirical point of 
view, “the extra strength of the realist position is illusory” (2000, 844).
So, van Fraassen rejects realism and advocates constructive empiricism, not because he thinks the 
former is irrational, but because the latter “makes better sense of science […] than realism does and 
does so without inflationary metaphysics” (1980, 73, my emphasis). 
Despite  this,  Ladyman  thinks  that  constructive  empiricism  has  no  normative  force  for  a  non-
empiricist,  and  as  such,  a  stalemate  has  been  reached.  In  (2000),  Ladyman  presents  the  most 
troublesome argument yet against van Fraassen in an attempt to give positive grounds for rejecting 
constructive empiricism. 
3. LADYMAN’S OBJECTION TO CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM
Ladyman begins  by analysing  van  Fraassen’s  various  (inconsistent)  writings  on  modality2,  and 
concludes  that  there  are  several  viable  interpretations  of  van  Fraassen’s  views.  None  of  them 
however, particularly van Fraassen’s modal nominalist position, involve the belief in objectively 
construed  (theory-independent)  modal  statements,  which  Ladyman  argues  the  constructive 
empiricist  needs  (in  order  to  circumscribe  the  observable  in  a  principled  way),  but  explicitly 
rejects3.  
For van Fraassen, observable phenomena need not actually be observed. Rather, a phenomena is 
observable “if there are circumstances which are such that, if [the phenomena] is present to us under 
those circumstances, then we observe it” (1980, 16). For example, van Fraassen recommends that 
we should believe in dinosaurs and the moons of Jupiter because were circumstances to obtain such 
that they were present to us (e.g. if we were standing on the latter), then we would observe them. 
Ladyman identifies two consequent questions about the claim that entity X is observable (2000, 
850):
a) Is X’s observability a theory-independent fact?
b) If so how can we know such a fact?
Ladyman considers b) first. Recall that van Fraassen describes the ‘able’ in ‘observable’ as referring 
2 See in particular (1979, 412), (1980, 197) and (1989, 213). 
3 Recall what van Fraassen says:  “To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual, 
observable phenomena, and to recognize no objective modality in nature.” (1980, 203, my emphasis).
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to  our  limitations  as  measuring  devices,  described  by the  ‘final  physics  and biology’.  On this 
account,  science  determines  what  is  or  is  not  observable.  However,  scientific  theories  concern 
themselves not only with actual, but also with possible  observations. But, argues Ladyman, “how 
can van Fraassen rely upon theoretical science, which he does not believe to be true, to determine 
the limits of his scepticism?” (2000, 850). 
If observability was a theory-dependent matter, then whether certain phenomena were observable or 
not would depend on which theory was used to describe them. Were this the case though, then the 
observable/unobservable  distinction  would  have  “no  epistemic  significance  and  constructive 
empiricism could not be sustained” (Ladyman 2000, 850). Van Fraassen concedes this much: 
To find the limits of what is observable in the world described by theory T we must inquire into 
T itself […] This might produce a vicious circle if what is observable were itself not simply a 
fact disclosed by theory, but rather theory-relative or theory dependent. […] I regard what is 
observable as a theory-independent question. It is a function of facts about us qua organisms in 
the world (1980, 57-58).
Therefore, van Fraassen must answer a) with an affirmative: if X is observable then it is an 
objective fact that if it were present to us then we would observe it. 
The problem arises when we recall that the circumstances necessary for the observation of certain 
observable phenomena never actually obtain: they are counterfactual. For van Fraassen to be able 
to  demarcate  these  as observable,  he  must  believe  at  least  some  counterfactuals  implied  by 
scientific theories such as ‘if a dinosaur were presented to us in the appropriate circumstance, then 
we would  observe  it’.  Furthermore,  van  Fraassen  must  take  such  modal  facts  to  be  objective. 
Otherwise,  his  epistemic  attitude  “will  depend  upon  a  distinction  that  is  entirely  arbitrary” 
(Ladyman 2000, 851). 
It seems then that the constructive empiricist must engage in some objective modal metaphysics in 
order to sustain his epistemic attitude towards science. However, if van Fraassen were to recognise 
an objective modality (say, by becoming a modal realist) and consequently allow objective modal 
facts  to  determine  the  truth  value  of  counterfactuals,  this  would  be  ‘totally  incompatible  with 
constructive empiricism’ argues Ladyman. Recognising an objective modality would be at  odds 
with  the  empiricist’s  disdain  for  modality  and  would  undercut  van  Fraassen’s  chief  positive 
argument for the constructive empiricist position; namely that it can do away with metaphysics. 
Hence,  “in  the  face  of  these  problems”  concludes  Ladyman,  “[…]  constructive  empiricism  is 
untenable as a philosophy of science” (2000, 855).
3.1 VAN FRAASSEN AND MONTON’S REPLY TO LADYMAN
In ‘Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism’ (2003), Bradley Monton and van Fraassen 
attempt  to  clarify  various  aspects  of  the  constructive  empiricist  position  in  face  of  Ladyman’s 
argument, by addressing whether the objectivity of the observable requires there to be objective 
modal  truths.  They  argue  that  this  is  not  the  case  and  that  counterfactuals  relating  to  the 
observability  of  unobserved  phenomena  can be  objectively  true  because  observability  is  an 
objective, non-modal property. That is to say, the “status [of] observability […] is not different from 
that of […] ‘made of brick’ or ’75 feet long’ (2003, 413).
Monton and van Fraassen argue this point by means of an example: To determine whether gun 
flashes would be visible under certain  conditions,  a scientist  determines  the properties of these 
flashes such as their duration and intensity. If successful, he would conclude that a certain range of 
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values for certain measurable parameters pertaining to the flash would be ‘jointly necessary and 
sufficient for visibility under certain conditions’ (2003, 413). So, without involving any modality, 
the scientist is able to determine whether a gun’s flash would be observable or not under certain 
conditions. Monton and van Fraassen propose that “what goes here for the visibility of gun flashes 
[…] goes equally for observability in general of any sort of object, event or process” (2003, 413). 
Therefore, generalities about actual facts determine what is observable. No objective modalities are 
needed to account for the epistemic attitude of the constructive empiricist.
3.2 LADYMAN’S REBUTTAL
In response to Monton and van Fraassen’s claim that what is observable will follow from certain 
generalities about actual facts, Ladyman correctly argues that unless we consider generalisations in 
the  form  of  scientific  laws  to  have  correctly  latched  on  to  objective  features  of  the  world, 
generalisations about what actually happens to as-yet-unobserved phenomena will not be enough to 
determine anything about what would happen if such phenomena were present to someone (2004, 
762). Since van Fraassen must reject the first premise (since accepting it would amount to becoming 
a scientific realist),  Ladyman concludes that science could never be used to determine whether 
something was objectively unobservable or just as of yet unobserved.
Indeed,  even  if  observability  was  an  objective  non-modal  property,  the  connection  between 
observability and counterfactuals could not be ‘sundered’, for as Ladyman rightly argues, “in the 
case of observable entities like unicorns and dragons, it is the truth of the counterfactual claim that 
if they had been present to us we would have observed them which assures us that there are no such 
things” (2004, 763). 
3.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the last section of their paper, van Fraassen and Monton seem to partly cave in to Ladyman’s 
critique by suggesting that it may be easier for a modal realist to be a constructive empiricist than 
for a modal antirealist. They suggest that adopting modal realism would not ‘vitiate’ the arguments 
that  make  constructive  empiricism  plausible.  While  adopting  modal  realism  would amount  to 
embracing some inflationary metaphysics admits van Fraassen, he concludes that other motivating 
arguments still exist for constructive empiricism that ‘do not depend on modal metaphysics’ and 
allow constructive empiricism to make the best sense of science (2003, 421). 
I  think  that  van  Fraassen’s  concluding  remarks  are  inappropriate  and  unnecessary.  Giving  an 
account  of  the  aims  and  practices  of  science  without  appeal  to  inflationary  metaphysics  has 
traditionally been one of constructive empiricism’s greatest strengths and principle motivation, and 
it should not be given up so easily. In what follows, I argue that by adopting modal agnosticism, the 
constructive  empiricist  can  overcome  Ladyman’s  objection  while  remaining  true  to  his 
programme’s original rationale. To motivate my claim, I will first need to locate modal agnosticism 
in the wider possible world debate and explain the position in detail.
4. AN INTRODUCTION TO POSSIBLE WORLDS
Our everyday use of words such as ‘possibly’, ‘might’, ‘could’, ‘necessarily’, ‘must’ and so on, lays 
bare our intuition that some but not all things could have been otherwise. Questions about such 
matters are questions about modality. These modal notions should be distinguished from epistemic 
possibilities. Consider the statement “for all we know, there may or may not be a solution to the ‘N 
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vs. NP’ problem”. Epistemically, either option is possible, but whatever the answer proves to be, it 
could not have been otherwise (it is necessary in a modal sense).
Modal notions are most commonly interpreted through talk of possible worlds. For such talk to be 
philosophically useful, we need to know what it means and what is gained by its application. This 
depends on the view one takes of possible worlds. The traditional debate is conducted by the realist, 
committed to the view that a plurality of possible worlds exists, and the antirealist who denies this.
4.1 GENUINE REALISM
The most infamous type of realism about possible worlds is David Lewis’ genuine realism. The 
theory’s salient ontological theses include (Divers 2002, 45-6):
(OC1) An  infinite  plurality  of  possible  worlds  exists.
(OC2) Possible worlds differ only in content, not in kind, to our 
own.
(OC3) ‘Actuality’ is indexical - from the standpoint of each world, that world 
is itself ‘actual’, and all other worlds non-actual.
(OC4) Possible worlds are spatiotemporally and causally isolated from every 
other world, except from itself, or part of a world.
(OC5) Individuals are world-bound in that  they don’t  wholly exist  in more 
than one world.
4.2 GENUINE REALISM’S INTERPRETATION OF POSSIBLE WORLDS
Genuine realism interprets possible world talk differently depending on whether it involves de dicto 
or de re modality. For the purposes of this paper, modalising de re will be understood as modalising 
about  a  specific  object  or  thing,  such  as  David  Attenborough,  while  modalising  de  dicto is 
modalising about a proposition, such as ‘blue swans exist’. Following John Divers (2002, 43), in a 
straightforward case of  de dicto possibility,  we start  with a claim in English (DD1), move to a 
neutral possible world claim (DD2) and then to the genuine realist interpretation (GR1):
(DD1) There could have been blue swans.
(DD2) There is a possible world at which there are blue swans.
(GR1) )&&&( SyByPyxWxyx∃∃ 4
As  interpreted  by  genuine  realism,  a  world  (‘Wx’)  is  construed  as  possible  by  virtue  of  its 
unrestricted existence (‘ ...)...(Wxx∃ ’), and the existence of blue swans (‘By & Sy’) at the world is 
construed as the world having such things among its parts (‘Pyx’).
In the case of de re possibility, we start with a claim in English (DR1), move to neutral PW claim 
(DR2) and then to the genuine realism interpretation (GR2):
(DR1) David Attenborough could have worked for Channel 4.
(DR2) There is a possible world at which David Attenborough works for Channel 4.
(GR2) )&&&( HyCydPyxWxyx∃∃ 5
(GR2) is interpreted as before, but additionally, for the world to represent David Attenborough as 
4 Where Wx = x is a world, Pyx = y is a part of x, By = y is a blue and Sy = y is a swan
5 Where Cyd = y is a counterpart of d, d = David Attenborough and Hy = y works for H and H = Channel 4. 
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working for Channel 4, it needs to have as a part a  counterpart of David Attenborough (‘Cyd’), 
where that counterpart works for Channel 4 (‘Hy’).
As shown, Lewis’ system offers a “system of analyses of the family of modal concepts in which no 
modal concept is taken as primitive, and which underwrite the practise of conducting our modal 
reasoning in the medium of ordinary first-order quantificational logic” (Divers 2004, 660). While 
Lewis believed that his realism was credible on a cost-benefit analysis (1986), the theory has struck 
many as simply too ontologically extravagant and epistemologically indefensible. 
4.3 ERSATZ MODAL REALISM
Before proceeding, I wish to briefly distinguish Lewis’ genuine realism from what he calls ‘ersatz 
modal realism’. Ersatzists think a plurality of possible worlds exist, but that these are abstract rather 
than concrete entities. Only one of these ersatz worlds represents the concrete world correctly: it is 
the actualised ersatz world.  All  of the other ersatz worlds remain unactualised.  Like the modal 
antirealist, the ersatz realist tries to derive the benefits of genuine realism from a more ‘safe and 
sane’ ontology. Unfortunately,  it  is beyond the scope of this essay to consider ersatz realism in 
further detail. I point the interested reader to Lewis (1986) or Divers (2002), both who argue against 
ersatzism, for a fuller treatment. 
4.4 MODAL ANTIREALISM
Modal  antirealists  wish  to  benefit  from  talking  as  if possible  worlds  existed  without  being 
committed to the genuine realist’s ontology. They must adopt an interpretational stance of possible 
world  speak  that  avoids  commitment  to  the  following  three-part  conjunction:  (a)  declarative 
sentences involving possible worlds are truth apt, (b) some are true and (c) some have a semantic 
structure that validly entails the existence of a non-actual world (Divers 2002, 22). 
In the following sections, as space is limited, I will only briefly introduce modal expressivism and 
modal fictionalism so as to be able to develop the error-theoretic and agnostic modal positions in 
greater detail.
4.4.1 DENYING TRUTH APTNESS: MODAL EXPRESSIVISM
There are three different strategies the antirealist could adopt. The most radical is to deny the first 
conjunct (a) and hold that possible world sentences are never truth-apt. A parallel can be drawn with 
Blackburn’s  Expressivism about  moral  judgements.  Expressivists  maintain  that  when we make 
moral judgements, we do not refer to a moral fact. Rather, we say something that is reflective of an 
attitude  we  hold.  For  example,  when  someone  utters  the  sentence  “murder  is  wrong”,  the 
expressivist account interprets them as saying “Boo! to murder” rather than “the statement ‘murder 
is wrong’ is true”. While space does not permit me to do so, Blackburn has indicated how and why a 
modal antirealist might appeal to such a strategy (1984, 213-6). 
4.4.2 DENYING APPROPRIATE SEMANTIC STRUCTURE: MODAL 
FICTIONALISM
Alternatively,  the  antirealist  could  deny  conjunct  (c)  and  adopt  a  ‘structure-based  antirealism’ 
(Divers 2002, 23), refusing to accept that possible world sentences have the necessary semantic 
structure which permits valid inference to the existence of non-actual worlds. The most discussed 
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version of such a strategy is known as modal fictionalism. 
The typical modal fictionalist claims that possible worlds are merely fictional entities: there is no 
actualised  possible  world  in  which  blue  swans  literally  exist.  Rather  the  literal  truth  is  that 
according to the fiction of Genuine Realism, there is a possible world in which blue swans exist. On 
this account, possible world talk such as “there is a possible world in which blue swans exist” 
should be understood in the same way as talk about paradigmatically fictional objects, such as 
“there is a brilliant detective at 221b Baker Street” (Rosen 1990). Unfortunately, formal proofs have 
recently been developed showing that modal fictionalism is self-refuting. In particular, I point the 
reader to Stuart Brock’s paper (1993).
4.4.3 DENYING TRUTH: MODAL ERROR THEORY
Lastly, the antirealist could grant that declarative possible world sentences are truth-apt and that 
they mean what they appear to mean, but deny conjunct (b) by refusing to assent to the truth of any 
possible  world sentence.  Divers  calls  such strategies ‘Factualist  Antirealism’ and identifies  two 
strands: error-theoretic and agnostic. 
The characteristic claim of the stronger error-theoretic position is that all sentences of PW discourse 
are false. Again, a parallel can be drawn with moral theory, where J. L. Mackie has proposed an 
error theory about moral properties. Mackie holds that moral claims ascribe moral properties (such 
as  wrongness)  to  items  (such  as  murder).  Moral  claims  are  true  when  they  actually  have  the 
properties  ascribed  to  them and  false  otherwise.  However,  Mackie  argues  that  because  moral 
properties would be queer if they existed, moral claims are always false because moral properties do 
not exist. 
The ontology of the error-theoretic possible world theorist is that no world apart from the actual 
world exists. Subsequently, any sentence of possible world discourse which entails the existence of 
a  non-actual  world  is  false.  As  Divers  notes,  this  position  has  a  direct  impact  on  our  modal 
commitments,  for  “error  theory  about  possible-worlds,  when  allied  with  Lewisian  analyses, 
generates  a  collapse of  the  de dicto modalities”6 (Divers  2004,  667).  To see this,  consider  the 
following Lewisian interpretations of possibility, impossibility, necessity, and contingency:
(LP) It is possible that X iff there is some world at which X.
(LI) It is impossible that X iff there is no world at which X.
(LN) It is necessary that X iff at all worlds, X.
(LC) It is contingent whether X iff there is a world at which X and a world at which 
not-X.
Since the actual world is the only world that exists according to the error-theorist’s ontology, all and 
only that which is true de dicto of the actual world is true of some and all worlds. Hence, all that is 
true  de dicto of  the  actual  world  is  necessarily true  and all  that  is  not  true  is  impossible;  the 
existence of donkeys is necessary, and the existence of blue swans impossible. Furthermore, since 
contingency requires the truth of X at one world and the falsity of X at a  different world, error 
theory rules out what contingency requires (namely, the existence of a plurality of worlds). It seems 
then that error theory causes the collapse of more modalities than is desirable.
6 The error-theorist is entitled to assert certain de re modalities without contradiction. As this is also true of the agnostic 
position which we shall cover later (see section 5.3) an error-theoretic account of de re modalities will not be considered 
here.
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Let us now turn to the weaker of the two factualist antirealist strands, modal agnosticism, which 
promises to partly prevent such a collapse.
5. MODAL AGNOSTICISM
In “Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality” (2004), Divers 
introduces modal agnosticism. Like van Fraassen who wants the benefits of micro-physical theory 
without commitment to unobservables, the modal agnostic wishes to secure at least some of the 
benefits associated with genuine realism without committing to the genuine realist’s ontology. The 
characteristic commitment of the modal agnostic is that she holds herself as having no warrant for 
believing in the existence of any possible world other than the actual world. The modal agnostic 
should not assert any sentence which entails the existence of a world beyond that of the actual 
world, even though for all they know, some may be true (2004, 668).
5.1 RADICAL OR MODERATE?
Two types of agnosticism are worth differentiating: moderate and radical. Both the moderate and 
the radical agnostic are agnostic about the existence of any possible world other than the actual one, 
but  where  the  moderate  agnostic’s  agnostic  beliefs  may  give  way  to  disbelief  in  light  of 
characterisations which would make the world an impossible one (where the world instantiates Q 
and  not-Q  simultaneously  for  example),  the  radical  agnostic  would  remain  agnostic  about  the 
existence of such a world (Divers 2004, 669).
The distinction between moderate and radical agnosticism is significant, for just as the error-theorist 
cannot prevent the collapse of many modalities, if the agnostic adopts a radical stance, she will be 
unable to prevent becoming comprehensively agnostic about modality. Such an approach would be 
highly undesirable as none of the benefits associated with genuine realism could be salvaged. On a 
Lewisian cost-benefit analysis, it is unlikely that radical agnosticism would fare well.
5.2 MODERATE AGNOSTICISM
The  moderate  agnostic  on  the  other  hand  can  ‘forestall  retreat’ as  she  does  not need  to  be 
comprehensively agnostic  about  modality (Divers 2004, 669).  The moderate agnostic  (hereafter 
simply ‘agnostic’) can thereby retain the expressive power afforded by genuine realism to many 
modalities, including claims of necessity, impossibility, de re possibilities and counterfactuals. 
5.2.1 NECESSITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES
The agnostic can warrantedly claim to know things7 as long as they do not posit or require belief in 
a possible world beyond the actual world. With this in mind, recall the Lewisian interpretation of 
impossibility (LI) and necessity (LN): 
(LI) It is impossible that X iff there is no world at which X.
This can be expressed as:
(LI*) )&( yPWyyX ∈¬ ∃↔¬ ◊ 8
(LN1) It is necessary that X iff at all worlds, X.
7 At least in as much as the genuine realist has a warrant to claim to know the matters in question.
8 Where Wy = y is a world.
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By principles of first order logic, (LN1) can equivalently be interpreted as:
(LN2) It is necessary that X iff there is no world at which not-X.
And this can be expressed as:
(LN2*)   □ )&( yPWyyX ∉¬ ∃↔
Unrestricted negative existential claims do not posit the existence of a world (‘... Wyy(¬ ∃ ...)’ as in 
(LI*) and (LN2*) above) beyond the actual, and hence, the agnostic retains licence to assert them9. 
Therefore, the agnostic can express claims of necessity and impossibility such (LI) and (LN1).
5.2.2 COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS
In addition to necessity and impossibility claims, Divers (2004) argues that the modal agnostic also 
has grounds for claiming modal knowledge of counterfactual conditionals of the form:
(CF) A □à C iff there is no selected world at which (A-and-not-C)10
According to Divers, the realist has to earn the right to assert a counterfactual by “making the case 
that the satisfaction of the selection condition […] presents grounds for believing that there is no 
world which is  an  A-and-not-C world  and a selected world” (2004, 672).  The three conditions 
Divers outlines which are needed for this to happen are:
i) Contextual factors and factual considerations about the actual world do enough 
to constrain an appropriate selection relation to fill out the truth condition of 
the counterfactual
ii) The pragmatic,  linguistic  and factual knowledge of the speaker  combine to 
determine the value of the truth-condition
iii) The realist  speaker  has justification for believing that the truth-condition is 
satisfied.
The crucial point, concludes Divers, is that at no point is the modal agnostic deprived of this story, 
and so can legitimately claim grounds for asserting counterfactual conditionals. 
The fact that the agnostic is not deprived of such modal knowledge can be further elucidated by 
expressing (CF) formally:
(CF*) (A □à C) )&&( yCySWyy A ∉¬ ∃↔
where the world selection condition ySA  is such that world y is a selected world only if A holds at 
y:
 (CFS*) yAyS A ∈→
As with (LI*) and (LN2*), at no point does (CF*) formally entail the existence of a possible world 
9 In fact, the agnostic can assert unrestricted negative existential claims whenever her logic presents them as logical 
truths, such as ‘it is impossible that there is something that is Q and not-Q’ (Divers 2004, 670).
10 This  is  the counterfactual  form preferred by Lewis (1986,  20-2).  As Divers  notes (2004,  671),  counterfactuals 
expressed in a positive existential form would render any counterfactual with an impossible antecedent such as (Q & 
¬Q) □à R as false rather than true, as no selected world would exist at which Q & ¬ Q and R, (since such a world 
would be impossible).
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(‘ ...)...(Wxx∃ ’).  Therefore,  “in so far  as the realist  is  in  a position to assert  the intuitively true 
counterfactuals, so is the worldly agnostic” (Divers 2004, 673). As I shall argue in section 6, this 
ability  is  key  in  overcoming  one  of  the  major  objections  facing  van  Fraassen’s  constructive 
empiricism. 
5.3 THE AGNOSTIC’S DEFICIT
As we have just seen, the modal agnostic need not be comprehensively agnostic about modality. 
However, despite the agnostic’s entitlement to certain claims of necessity and impossibility, she 
must remain agnostic about certain modal claims of possibility and contingency. 
To illustrate the deficiency, recall the Lewisian interpretations of possibility and contingency:
(LP) It is possible that X iff there is some world at which X.
(LC) It is contingent whether X iff there is a world at which X and a world    
   at which not-X.
The agnostic must remain agnostic about the right hand sides of the biconditionals in (LP) and 
(LC), entailing an agnosticism about the left hand side of the biconditionals as well. To understand 
why, consider an arbitrary biconditional, P iff Q. If one does not want to be agnostic about P, then 
one must hold P to be true or false. If the biconditional is to be true however, P must be true, and 
hence on pain of irrationality, Q must be held to be true also. However, holding Q to have a truth 
value  is  contrary to  being  agnostic  about  Q.  Hence,  agnosticism about  the  right  side,  Q,  of  a 
biconditional entails agnosticism about the left side, P, and vice versa. 
For example, reconsider the familiar statement:
(DD1) ‘There could have been blue swans’.
As we have shown previously, the statement on a Lewisian interpretation becomes thus:
(DD2) There is a possible world at which there are blue swans.
Reformulated as a biconditional, (DD2) becomes:
(DD3) It is possible that there are blue swans iff there is some world at which there 
are blue swans.
Here then, the agnostic wants to remain agnostic about the right side of the biconditional ‘there is 
some world’, forcing the agnostic to remain agnostic about the left side: the possibility of there 
being blue swans. 
5.3.1 LIMITING THE DEFICIT
This example of  de dicto possibility may be misleading however,  as the modal  possibility and 
contingency deficit facing the agnostic need not be as comprehensive as the analysis initially seems 
to suggest. 
In section 4.4 of On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis discusses his theory of representation of de re 
possibility, stating that “[p]ossibilities are not always possible worlds” (1986, 230). To illustrate 
what he means, Lewis imagines that he himself could have been someone else, namely Fred, who 
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exists in the actual world. Lewis argues:
[Fred] is even a possible way for me to be. He is my counterpart under an extraordinarily 
generous counterpart relation, one which demands nothing more of counterparts than that they 
be things of the same kind. […]. The possibility in question is a possibility for me, not for the 
world. It is not some other world, differing haecceitistically from ours, which represents de re 
of me that I am Fred; it is Fred himself, situated as he is within our world (Lewis 1986, 232).
The modal agnostic may take great solace in Lewis’ theory of de re representation, for armed with 
it, she no longer faces an assertibility deficit of de re claims of the type ‘possibly X’, when it is false 
that X but an appropriate this-worldly counterpart is X in the actual world. So, the agnostic can 
assert as confidently as the realist that “It is possible that Attenborough could have worked for 
Channel 4”, because a counterpart of Attenborough exists in the actual world who does work for 
Channel  4.  This account  appropriately captures  the contingency of  Attenborough’s  employment 
with the BBC, rather than making it necessary.  
Therefore, as Divers summarises, the agnostic faces assertibility deficits only over claims of the 
type ‘possibly X’ where i) she has no warrant to assert that there is no world at which X and ii) no 
warrant to assert that at the actual world X (2004, 674).
6. SAVING CONSTRUCTIVE EMPIRICISM: MODAL AGNOSTICISM
Recall the constructive empiricist’s dilemma: if constructive empiricism is to be a coherent position, 
observability needs to be accounted for in a principled, non-arbitrary manner. Since van Fraassen 
has not done enough to show that observability can be construed objectively yet non-modally in all 
circumstances,  the  distinction  between  observables  and  unobservables  can’t  be  drawn  without 
recognising an objective modality in nature by accepting modal realism. Yet in spite of what van 
Fraassen says, doing so would amount to undermining the main motivation for being a constructive 
empiricist.
Ladyman’s  objection  need  not  spell  the  end  of  constructive  empiricism  as  a  tenable  position 
however. I think that if the constructive empiricist were to become a modal agnostic, she  could 
circumscribe the observable/unobservable distinction in a principled manner without entailing an 
inflationary metaphysics, thereby avoiding Ladyman’s objection altogether. 
Recall van Fraassen’s ‘rough guide’ to what counts as observable:
(O1) “X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present 
to us under those circumstances, then we observe it” (1980, 16). 
If we consider van Fraassen’s popular example about the moons of Jupiter, and interpret (O1) in 
terms of possible worlds, we get:
(O2) There is no world that is physically possible relative to this world in which the 
moons of Jupiter are present to us in the right kind of circumstances and we 
fail to observe them.
Subsequently, (O2) can equivalently be interpreted as a counterfactual conditional:
(O3) If the moons of Jupiter are present to us in the right kind of circumstances then 
we observe them (they are observable) iff there is no selected world at which 
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they are present in the right circumstances and we fail to observe them.
According  to  Ladyman,  this  is  the  type  of  counterfactual  conditional  which  the  constructive 
empiricist must be able to evaluate objectively in order to sustain a non-arbitrary distinction, but 
can’t  without  adopting modal  realism since the latter  is  the only modal  position which allows 
counterfactuals like (O3) to be evaluated objectively.
However, if ‘the moons of Jupiter are present’ =  A, ‘we observe them’ =  C and a world  y is a 
selected  world  (selected  by the  selection  condition ySA )  only if  A holds  at  y11,  then  (O3)  can 
formally be expressed as:
(O3*) (A □à C) )&&( yCySWyy A ∉¬ ∃↔
Notice  that  (O3*)  has  exactly  the  same  formal  form  as  (CF*),  the  formal  expression  of 
counterfactual  conditionals  I  argued  were  expressible  by  the  modal  agnostic  in  Section  5.2.2. 
Therefore, I think that modal agnosticism could provide van Fraassen with the tools he needs to 
circumscribe the observable from the unobservable in a principled manner, allowing him to avoid 
Ladyman’s objection all together.
 
6.1 POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are a number of objections that could arise from my proposal. These include: 
i) If  modal  agnosticism can  express  counterfactual  claims  objectively,  then  it 
must  entail,  like  modal  realism,  inflationary metaphysics.  Therefore,  modal 
agnosticism is incompatible with constructive empiricism.
ii) If modal agnosticism was a natural match for constructive empiricism, then the 
constructive empiricist would already have adopted it.
Someone objecting that modal agnosticism and constructive empiricism are incompatible on the 
grounds outlined in (i) could only have misunderstood the modal agnostic project. The very aim of 
the agnostic  programme is  to  garner  as  many benefits  as possible  from genuine realism while 
avoiding the inflationary possible world ontology Lewis’ programme entails. 
The realist could reply that all possible inflation isn’t avoided, since the agnostic, unlike the modal 
error-theorist,  acknowledges  that  other  possible  worlds  may exist,  even  if  she holds  herself  as 
having no warrant for believing in their existence. While this may be so, I would reply that the 
agnostic’s epistemic attitude remains entirely compatible with that of the constructive empiricist’s; 
both wish to remain agnostic about the existence of ontologically problematic entities that fall in 
their domain (possible worlds and unobservable phenomena respectively). Recall that while the 
constructive empiricist initially seemed to be in trouble for being unable to do without theory-laden 
language, van Fraassen was able to respond to this charge. I expect that if accused of using possible 
world laden language,  the modal  agnostic  could respond in kind.  Consequently,  the parallel  in 




In response to (ii), there are various reasons which may explain why the constructive empiricist has 
not  yet  adopted modal  agnosticism.  From a pragmatic  perspective,  while  Divers has  published 
numerous papers developing modal agnosticism, the first of these appeared only after the principle 
constructive empiricist – realist debate conducted by van Fraassen and Ladyman ended in 2004. 
Thus, a properly developed version of modal agnosticism was not yet available with which van 
Fraassen could have responded.
Secondly, modal agnosticism still remains in its infancy. While Divers has worked hard to try and 
show that the modal agnostic can live with the modal deficit discussed in Section 5.3 (see Divers 
2004), future research may reveal that the modal agnostic or constructive empiricist in fact cannot. 
Alternatively,  further  investigation  may reveal  other  serious  shortcomings  with  Divers’ theory. 
Consequently,  it  is  no  surprise  that  constructive  empiricists  like  van  Fraassen  may have  been 
reluctant to adopt modal agnosticism too quickly. 
Until shown otherwise however, I think my suggestion is one the constructive empiricist should 
take seriously. Though it may require the constructive empiricist to ‘stick her neck out’, I think that 
adopting modal agnosticism, even at this early stage, is a more promising route for the constructive 
empiricist  to take than for her  to abandon the main motivation for her position in light of the 
realist’s challenge.
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How We Each Maintain Our Personal Identity
Mark Pexton
In this essay I will address the broad topic of personal identity. This topic deals with the problem of 
how we can truly claim that a person is the same person throughout his life or indeed over any 
period of his life. What is it about a person that means I can refer to him as a continuing entity? I 
will  argue  that  some traditional  approaches  to  identity miss  the real  question  and propose that 
identity resides in a self’s characteristic interaction with the world.  
One’s first response may well be that no, a person is never the same from one moment to the next, 
we refer to people by the same names only for convenience. Our experiences, our environment 
changes us and also we change ourselves from within. Our body is programmed to change when we 
grow older. Indeed we are not even the same from moment to moment, we have moods.
And is there even a self to talk about at all? Hume saw us as composed of our experience. We have 
a perspective but the viewer himself is elusive and indescribable. When we examine ourselves to 
find our self we find nothing but the present content of our experience. 
So when we talk of our own lives what are we talking of, what is it that is born and dies? What is a 
self?
First let us be clear on some terms. We clearly accept that at no two points is a person identical in 
body or in mind, ‘Maximum similarity within the groupings would limit  them to atomic-point-
instants.  The  purpose  of  the  identity  notion  is  wider  breadth,  but  a  grouping  that  included 
everything would not convey specific information’12. But this in my opinion is a different question 
from that of identity and here the main thrust of this essay differs from the view that, ‘the relation of 
identity is logically one-one: I cannot be identical to two distinct people.’13 Identity is an abstract 
12 Robert Nozick, Personal Identity Through Time (pg 108 of Personal Identity ed. by Martin and Barresi, 2007)
13 Brian Garrett, Personal Identity in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 2005
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